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ture of its files must be weighed not only against the interest of an individual in a fair hearing but also against the public interest in the fair
administration of justice."9 In hearings where the effect of the determination goes far beyond the sanction of the hearing itself, as in the
discharge of an employee for security reasons, it is urged that the Government should be entitled to maintain the secrecy of its files only when
public policy so dictates in the interest of national security.'
If due
process does not command such a procedure, and the Court is unwilling
to demand it, then public policy should require it in the character of a
congressional enactment.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST PROVISO TO SECTION 9 (a)
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act as originally
enacted provided:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. Provided,
that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.'
The Taft-Hartley Act added to the proviso so that it presently states:
99. Judge L. Hand expressed an even more liberal view: "Risk for risk, for myself,
I had rather take my chance that some traitors will escape detection than spread abroad
a general suspicion and distrust, which accepts rumor and gossip in place of undismayed
and unintimidated inquiry. I believe that that community is already in a process of
dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy. .. ."
Address by Judge Learned Hand at the 86th Convocation of the University of the
State of New York, Oct. 24, 1952, at Albany, New York.
100. See Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953) where it is stated: "Whether or not
a particular utilization of informers is constitutional should not be the decisive test;
often what escapes constitutional interdiction is nevertheless unwise or unfair." Id. at 230.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed the same view in the following manner: "Civil
liberties draw at best only limited strength from legal guarantees. Preoccupation by
our people with the constitutionality, instead of with the wisdom, of legislation or of
executive action is preoccupation with a false value. . . . Focusing attention on constitutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom." Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (concurring opinion).
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 9(a), 42 Stat. 453 (1935).

NOTES
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment. 2
Neither the statutory language nor official interpretation has delineated the precise effect of the first proviso to section 9 (a) upon the subject of employee grievances. Although no attempt will be made in this
writing to attach a single interpretation to the proviso, its exact meaning
is important to the problems to be considered, viz.: 1) whether a clause
granting the majority union the exclusive right to negotiate employee
grievances may be insisted upon as a condition precedent to consummation of a collective-bargaining agreement; 2) the effect of such a clause
upon the common law requirement that an employee exhaust his internal
remedies before bringing suit against his employer for a breach of contract involving the collective-bargaining agreement.
Clearly the proviso protects the employer from a charge of an unfair
labor practice if the employer allows employees to present grievances exclusive of union intervention and neither the presentation nor the adjustment conflicts3 with the bargaining agreement.4 Problems arise only
when an attempt is made to delimit the correlative rights and duties of
the employer, individual employee, and majority representative. One
view is that the proviso merely grants the employer a permissive right to
entertain individual grievances. The presentation and adjustment of
grievances under section 9 (a) would then be wholly dependent upon the
discretion of the employer. On the other hand, the proviso may bestow
an affirmative right on the individual employee to present his grievance
exclusive of union intervention, and may even place a duty upon the
2. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), added by 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952).
3. If the adjustment is inconsistent with any of the terms of the bargaining agreement, § 9(a) negatively implies that the union has the right to intervene. The act of an
employer in permitting individual employees to present grievances could only conflict
with the bargaining agreement when the agreement grants the union the exclusive right
of presentation. The union's right of redress, if any, would be found under the NLRA
in § 8(a) (5) and 8(d), which together proscribe the employer's "modification" of the
agreement in the absence of compliance with certain conditions of notice and mediation.
See John NV. Bolton and Sons, 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950).
4. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 79 Sup.

Ct. 98 (1958)

(No. 329, 1958 Term).
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employer to entertain grievances so presented.'
Several arguments may be made in support of the view that the proviso only grants the employer a permissive right. Although taken as a
whole the legislative history is inconclusive,6 statements made during the
debate in the House of Representatives seem to indicate that the proviso
could be rendered impotent by a collective-bargaining agreement.' Evidently these statements assumed that the language "not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement then in effect" could be
broadly interpreted to permit an agreement to be made precluding the
operation of the proviso.' Moreover, the proviso is placed in a section
of the statute which qualifies the status of the majority union and not in
a section asserting affirmative rights. Section 9 (a) is related directly
to section 8 (a) (5)9 which requires the employer t6 bargain with the
majority representative "subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
Therefore, the proviso can be said to state an exception to the employer's
duty to bargain exclusively with the majority union."
Finally, since section 9 (a) ostensibly provides no sanction for the claimed right, an argument can be made that Congress did not intend to grant an affirmative
right to the employee without a remedy, but rather a permissive right to
the employer.
Professor Cox contends that the union and the employer should have
the exclusive right to settle grievances in order to promote industrial
peace. 2 His arguments are premised upon the necessity of protecting
the majority union from raids by rival unions and dissident internal factions which would utilize the proviso to discredit the majority representative. Cox advocates protection of the employee by imposing trustee
5. See generally Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. Rav. 601
(1956) ; Dunau, Employee Participationin the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUMi. L. REV. 731 (1950); Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316 (1957) ; Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 143 (1955) ; Rose, The Processing of Labor Grievances,38 VA. L. REV. 285 (1952) ;
Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. PITT. L.
REv. 35 (1949); Comment, Individual Employee Grievances Under the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 154 (1949).
6. See generally Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of UnionManagement Agreements, 1954, supra note 5; Comment, Individual Employee Grievances
Under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, supra note 5.
7. 93 CONG. REC. 3624 (1947) (remarks of Mr. Lanham).
8. See Comment, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 154, 168 (1949).
9. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), added by 61 Stat. 141, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
10. See General Cable Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 443 (1953) (decision of arbitrator).
11. Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Manageient
Agreements, 1954, szapra note 5, at 178.
12. Cox, supra note 5, at 615-57.

NOTES
duties upon the union and enabling the employee to sue the union in the
event of a wrongful refusal to perform such duties.' 8
On the other hand, it is arguable that the proviso grants the employee an affirmative right. Although inconclusive, legislative history
seems to indicate that Congress intended to confer a right on the employee to settle grievances with his employer exclusive of union intervention."4 Reliance may also be placed on the fact that the language of the
proviso expresses an affirmative grant in stating that the individual
"shall have the right" to present grievances. Moreover, the right of the
employee to present his grievance may impose a correlative duty on the
employer to hear it. Congress, by granting the right, did not intend that
the parties to the agreement could modify or destroy it. Therefore, the
right of the individual arguably imposes a duty on the employer which
he cannot arbitrarily ignore.'" In answer to Professor Cox's fears of
industrial strife, if the employer attempts to use the proviso or allows it
to be used to discredit the majority union, the union can file an unfair
labor practice charge that the employer is discriminating in order to discourage union membership.'"
The argument that the proviso is without any sanction may be countered. Section 7"7 guarantees employees the right to refrain from union
activities, and interference with this right by the employer is prohibited
13. Id. at 630-38.
14. E.g. "An amendment contained in the revised proviso for § 9(a) clarifies the
right of individual employees or groups of employees to present grievances. The Board
has not given full effect to this right as defined in the present statute since it has adopted
a doctrine that if there is a bargaining representative he must be consulted at every
stage of the grievance procedure, even though the individual employee might prefer
to exercise his right to confer with his employer alone. . . . The revised language
would make it clear that the employee's right to present grievances exists independently
of the rights of the bargaining representative, if the bargaining representative has been
given an opportunity to be present at the adjustment, unless the adjustment is contrary
to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect." S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947). See generally Report of Committee on Improvement
of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, supra note 5, at 169-77;
Comment, Individual Employee Grievances Under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,
supra note 5.
15. Sherman, supra note 5, at 52.
16. Id. at 49. The employer's conduct may be violative of § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952), which proscribes an employer's "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
17. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a) (3)." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
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by section 8(a) (1)." s An employer's refusal to discuss grievances with
individual employees which compelled them to seek union aid in obtaining redress could be considered an interference with the employee's right
to refrain as guaranteed by section 7 and, therefore, violative of section
8(a) (1).19 Courts could also use their broad equitable powers to protect the right despite the absence of an express remedy."0
With regard to matters of policy, circumstances may engender employee desire to by-pass the union in the presentation of grievances. An
employee's anti-union sentiment may conflict with a requirement that he
seek union aid, or he may feel that union officials will not obtain an adequate settlement because of indifference or hostility to his complaint.
On the other hand, the employer, the union, or both may strongly desire
that the bargaining agreement contain a provision granting the majority
union the exclusive right to present employee grievances. Employers
may find it advantageous to deal only with the union from the dual
standpoint of facilitating administration of the grievance procedure and
promoting good relations with the union. Also, the union's attitude toward individuals presenting their own grievances may be hostile." Thus,
a question may arise during contract negotiations whether a clause granting the union the exclusive right to negotiate employee grievances can be
insisted upon as a condition precedent to consummation of the bargaining
agreement."2
18. "Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
19. Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Managentet
Agreements, 1954, supra note 5, at 178.

20. Ibid. "The absence of penalty is not controlling. The creation of a legal right
by language suitable to that end does not require for its effectiveness the imposition of
statutory penalties." Texas & N.O.R.Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569
(1930).
Although the Board has exclusive jurisdiction concerning protection of public rights
against unfair labor practices, Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167
F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1948), a federal court may issue an injunction to enjoin infringements
of private rights having their source in the NLRA. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,
223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. granted and case rev'd for further proceedings,
350 U.S. 892 (1955), petition for rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956), disposition on
the mnerits, 257 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1958). Compare, Leedom v. Kyne, 79 Sup. Ct. 180
(1958) ; Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945), rehearingdenied,
326 U.S. 803 (1945) ; Switchmen's Union of North America v. Nat'l Mediation Board,
320 U.S. 297 (1943).
21. Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Managcmnent
Agreements, x954, supra note 5, at 164-65.
22. For examples of collective-bargaining agreements making no provision for the
negotiation of grievances other than through a union agent, see agreements, Lever Bros.Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 5 CCH LABOR L. REP. 159926 (May 8, 1958) ; Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.-Textile Workers, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 159932 (Jan. 16, 1958).

NOTES
The NLRA proscribes as an unfair labor practice the refusal of an
employer or a union to bargain collectively.2" Section 8(d) defines bargaining collectively, in part, as "the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment ...
24 In determining whether a party has
fulfilled his duty to bargain, the National Labor Relations Board has not
always made its decisions turn upon the presence or absence of good faith.
Insistence by the union or employer that the bargaining agreement include certain matters as a condition precedent to consummation of the
agreement has frequently been held by the Board to be a per se violation
of the duty to bargain.25 In the recent case of NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp.26 the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's position
concerning per se violations. The Court agreed with the Board that an
employer's insistence upon a clause calling for a pre-strike vote of employees with regard to the employer's last offer and one excluding the
Board-certified union from the contract was per se violative of the duty
to bargain. The subject matter of these provisions was held not to be
within "the phrase 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' which defines mandatory bargaining."" The Court indicated,
however, that the clauses were lawful in themselves and would have been
enforceable if agreed to voluntarily before disagreement over their adoption caused an impasse in negotiations.23
Resolution of the problem concerning insistence upon an exclusive
grievance negotiation clause during contract negotiations appears to be
See generally Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Manage-

ment Agreements, 1954, supra note 5, at 167-69.
23. "Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-.
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." 61 Stat. 140, 141 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
24. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
25. NLRB v. Dalton Tel. Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824
(1951) (registration of union under state law) ; NLRB v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178
F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949) (ratification of union negotiated contract by non-union employees); National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686
(2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954, petition for rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 926
(1950) (closed shop). Compare NLRB v. American Natl Life Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395
(1952)
(rejecting application of per se doctrine to management functions clause);
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954), impliedly overruled
in part by, NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
Earlier the Board characterized the bargaining to impasse of certain subjects as
justifying an inference of lack of good faith. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118
F.2d 874, 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
26. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

27. Id. at 349.
28. Ibid.
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dependent upon the interpretation given the first proviso to section 9(a).
Assume that the proviso vests no rights in the employee and imposes no
duties upon the employer, but is only permissive in protecting the employer from a charge of an unfair labor practice. Since the employer
would have full discretion to exercise or refrain from exercising his permissive right in individual instances, he should be able to surrender this
right by agreement with the union for a term stipulated in the bargaining agreement. Therefore, an employer's insistence to impasse upon a
clause which would effect such a surrender should not result in a violation of his duty to bargain. Furthermore, if the union insists upon the
clause and it is accepted by the employer short of impasse, the clause
would be valid and enforceable. However, if the union urges the clause
and the employer refuses to consent, the clause probably cannot be insisted upon as a condition precedent to consummation of the agreement.
The Board's ruling in Bethlehem Steel Co. 9 seems to support the
foregoing conclusion. Bethlehem had insisted to point of impasse upon
a clause requiring the union to forego its right under the second proviso
of section 9(a), which proviso guarantees the union the right to be present at the adjustment of employee grievances. The Board held that although the employer had bargained in good faith such insistence constituted as a matter of law a refusal to bargain collectively."0 The Board
indicated, however, that a voluntary surrender of the right would not
have been unlawful. 3' If the sole effect of the first proviso to section
9(a) is to protect the employer from a charge of an unfair labor practice,
the employer would seem to have a right under the first proviso equal to
the right of the union under the second proviso. The union has a right
to be present at the adjustment of grievances and the employer has the
right to entertain individual grievances without the intervention of the
union. Both the union and employer may surrender these rights in the
bargaining process, but neither may insist to point of impasse that the
other surrender his respective right without committing a per se violation of the duty to bargain.
In addition, the analysis of the Supreme Court in Borg-Warner supports this conclusion. The employee vote clause was held not within the
phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"
because it substantially modified the collective bargaining system pro29. 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(failure of union to comply with non-communist requirements), followed in, E. I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 84 (1956). Compare Cranston Print Works Co.,
115 N.L.R.B. 537 (1956) (not insisted on to point of impasse).
30. 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 347 (1950).
31. 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 345 n.9 (1950).

NOTES
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vided in the statute. The clause effected such a modification by weakening the independence of the union and enabling the employer to deal with
the employees rather than with their statutory representative."2 Since
section 9 (a) is a specific exception to the employer's duty to bargain with
the union under section 8(a) (5), a clause requiring the employer to surrender his permissive right under section 9(a) would also substantially
modify the collective bargaining system provided in the statute.
A slightly different result should be reached if the first proviso imposes a duty upon the employer to hear employee grievances or vests a
right in the employee to present his grievance without the intervention of
the union. The decision of the Supreme Court in Elgin, I. & E. Ry. v.
Burley33 is indicative of the outcome under this interpretation. The Court
held that the Railway Labor Act 4 prevents the majority union from
vitiating an employee's common law action for past wages by settling the
employee's grievance without his authorization. In reaching this conclusion the Court stated that the employee's statutory rights concerning
presentation of his grievance cannot be destroyed by the collective contract. The Court derived these rights from the following provision of
the RLA:
Provided, that nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit
a carrier from permitting an employee, individually, or local
representatives of employees from conferring with management
during working hours without loss of time. ...."
In referring to this proviso, the Court stated that "the language clearly
contemplates also that the individual employee's right to confer with
the management about his own grievance is preserved." 8 In answer to
32. 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958). Although not expressly stated by the Court, the
clause excluding the Board-certified union from the contract may also be characterized
as substantially modifying the collective bargaining system provided in the statute.
Perhaps a general rule may be stated thus: Neither the union nor the employer may insist
to point of impasse that the other agree to a provision or condition which would substantially modify the statutory regulation of labor-management relations as provided
by the NLRA. The rule would extend to insistence on compliance with additional nonstatutory conditions, NLRB v. Dalton Telephone Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1952) (registration under local state law) ; or adoption of a
clause illegal under the NLRA, National Maritime Union, supra note 25 (closed shop) ;
or surrender of a statutory right, NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342 (1958) (status as majority representative).
33. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
34. 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1946).
35. Section 2, Fourth, 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth)

(1946).
36. Elgin, J.&E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 735 (1945). It is rather difficult to
understand how the Court arrived at this conclusion. The RLA proviso clearly speaks
in terms of a permissive right vested in the carrier to allow individuals to confer with
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the contention that the collective-bargaining agreement authorized the
union to settle employee grievances, the Court said:
The collective agreement could not be effective to deprive the
employees of their individual rights. Otherwise those rights
would be brought within the collective bargaining power by a
mere exercise of that power, contrary to the purport and effect
of the Act as excepting them from its scope and reserving them
to the individuals aggrieved. In view of that reservation the
Act clearly does not contemplate that the rights saved may be
nullified merely by agreement between the carrier and the
union.3"
If the first proviso of section 9(a) vests an affirmative right in the
employee, the Burley case indicates that this right cannot be bargained
away without the employee's consent. The proposed clause would contravene the express mandate of the Act and should be void for illegality
if adopted.3" Insistence by either party upon the clause as a condition
precedent to consummation of the bargaining agreement would result in
a per se violation"9 of the duty to bargain.4"
Section 9(a) may also affect the employee's right to sue on the bargaining agreement. Upon one theory or another most courts permit an
employee to maintain an action for an employer's breach of contract."'
To bring such an action, however, an employee must satisfy two requiremanagement, rather than a right vested in the employee. However, even though the
Court may have erroneously stated the effect of the RLA proviso, the conclusions reached
which were premised on this interpretation are no less sound.

37. Id. at 744.
38. This interpretation does not necessarily grant the individual employee more
power than the bargaining representative in the adjustment of grievances. The employee
is given the right to present his grievance to the employer and have it adjusted without
the intervention of the union. This right may be interpreted as imposing no correlative
duty on the employer to adjust grievances so presented, but only as proscribing an
employer's interference with the employee's right to present the grievance without the
intervention of the union. Such a right may be said to be an empty one, but it must be
remembered that the union also lacks any absolute ability to force the settlement of
grievances. The union only possesses more power to do so through economic pressures
than the individual employee.
39. Douds v. Int'l Longshoremans's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Pennello
v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950); National Maritime Union, 78
N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
954, petition for rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950). See note 32 supra.
40. A third alternative is that a clause granting the union the exclusive right to
present employee grievances is both valid as executed and bargainable to impasse. However, such a view would render the proviso a complete nullity which, in light of the above
discussion, is untenable.
41. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 352 (1951); Note, 3 BuFF. L. REv. 270
(1954).

NOTES
ments imposed by the courts. The first of these is a requirement that
the promise allegedly breached by the employer embrace a promise running to the employee rather than to the union. For example, the employee generally has standing to sue concerning the breach of wage42 or
seniority agreements,43 but not for an employer's breach of a closed shop
agreement" or an indirect attempt by the employer to avoid the collective
contract entirely.4" Secondly, the employee is generally required to exhaust every possibility of obtaining relief through the established grievance procedure provided in the bargaining agreement. At the outset, the
grievance procedure should be distinguished from an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract. Typical grievance machinery
involves a multi-step arrangement whereby the employee's grievance may
be submitted to various management personnel for settlement. If the
parties fail to agree after exhausting this procedure, provision may be
made for settlement through the intervention and decision of an arbitrator. An agreement to arbitrate, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, is generally held not to be a condition precedent to an action for
breach of other provisions of the agreement.4 6 However, most courts
require that the grievance procedure be exhausted prior to the employee's
suit.4" A problem arises concerning the effect of the first proviso to sec42. Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 95 P.2d 49 (1939) ; cases collected,
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 352, 365 (1954).
43. Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W.2d 247 (1920) ; cases collected, Annot.,
18 A.L.R.2d 366 (1954).
44. McKay v. Loews, Inc., 182 F.2d 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828,
petition for rehearingdenied, 340 U.S. 885 (1950).
45. Volguardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., 156 So. 678 (La. 1934).
46. Flaherty v. Metal Products Corp., 83 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955) ; Latter v. Holsum
Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421 (1945). Contra, Pettus v. Olga Coal Co., 137
V. Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881 (1952). Annot., 135 A.L.R. 79 (1951). The arbitration
agreement is enforceable, however, if the subject to be arbitrated is a mere finding of fact
essential to the accrual of a cause of action; Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876
(6th Cir. 1944). For an application of the New York arbitration statute see American
Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 322, 79 N.E.2d 425 (1948). With respect
to the effect of arbitration statutes, see generally note, 3 BUFF. L. Pav. 270, 277 (1954).
47. Harrison v. Pullman Co., 68 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Peoples v. South Pac.
Co., 139 F. Supp. 783 (D. Ore. 1955); Ringle v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Buberl v. Southern Pac. Co., 94 F. Supp. 11 (N.D.
Cal. 1950); Bell v. Western Ry. of Ala., 228 Ala. 328, 153 So. 434 (1934); Cone v.
Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 277 P.2d 464 (1954); Norfold & W. Ry.
v. Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S.W.2d 69 (1935) ; Caufield v. Yazoo & M.V.R., 170 La. 155,
127 So. 585 (1930); Mayfield v. Thompson, 262 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. 1953). Contra,
Dufour v. Continental Southern Lines, 219 Miss. 296, 68 So. 2d 489 (1953) ; Tri-State
Transit Co. v. Rawls, 191 Miss. 573, 1 So. 2d 497 (1941). The employee is not
required to exhaust, however, if the employer failed to fulfill his contractual requirement
of informing employees of the grievance procedure, United Protective Workers of
America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952) ; or if it would be useless to
attempt adjustment through the grievance procedure. Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware,
261 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Minor v. Washington Terminal Co., 180 F.2d 10 (D.C.
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tion 9(a) upon this exhaustion requirement when the bargaining agree•ment grants the union the exclusive right to negotiate employee grievances. The problem is best presented by an illustration.
Suppose the union and employer have executed a collective contract
in which the union is given the exclusive right to negotiate employee
grievances through a four step grievance procedure. The contract further provides that employees may be discharged only for just cause, but
review of discharges is available solely by seasonable request through the
established grievance procedure within thirty days after discharge. An
employee employed under this agreement receives what he feels is an
unfair termination of his services. On his own the employee attempts
to obtain review of his dismissal, but is informed by management personnel that he must utilize the contractual grievance procedure. The employee refuses to do so and, after the thirty day period has elapsed, brings
an action against the employer in a state court" for breach of the collective contract.49 The issue is then presented whether the employee may
invoke the protection of the first proviso of section 9(a) against a defense by the employer that the employee has failed to exhaust his internal
remedies. 0
Cir. 1950). Compare Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R.Co. v. Sizemore, 258 Ala. 344, 62
So. 2d 459 (1952), holding that when the employee sues for physical injuries incurred
because of an employer's failure to comply with the contract, no exhaustion is necessary
since the injury is "complete."
48. § 301 (a) of the NLRA provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952). This section does
not give the employee the right to bring suit in a federal court unless the union joins
as plaintiff. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952) ; Zaleski v. Local 401 of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 91 F.
Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1950) ; Schatte v. Int'l Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949),
af!'d on other grounds, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950). On
the other hand, the union lacks standing to maintain an action under § 301 (a) if only
individual, as distinguished from collective rights are involved. Ass'n of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955) (action for
wages). The argument that Congress preempted state court jurisdiction by the enactment
of § 301 (a) is untenable, and individual employees may maintain a common law action
in a state court for vindication of their individual rights. Bridges v. F. H. McGraw &
Co., 302 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1957).
49. The equitable remedy of reinstatement is generally not available. Masetta v.
National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15 (1953) ;
McMenamin v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 356 Pa. 88, 51 A.2d 702 (1947). The
employees action in the illustration would, therefore, be limited to a recovery of damages.
50. See Barker v. Southern Pac. Co., 214 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1954). The bargaining
agreement provided that the timely filing of request for review of discharges was a
prerequisite to any further proceedings under the contract or any possible appeal to courts

NOTES
At the outset the employee would be faced with the Board's dictum in
Dazey Corp." which imposed a severe limitation upon the type of grievance that the employee has the right to present under the proviso. Referring to the proviso the Board stated:
Section 9(a) gives the right to individuals and minority groups
to take certain grievances directly to the employer independent
of the recognized bargaining representative. However, to invoke the protection of Section 9 (a), such grievance must be outside of and not covered by the collective-bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, not only must the grievance sought not be covered
by the agreement, but the adjustment sought in such procedure
must not be inconsistent with such agreement. 2
The first proviso of section 9(a) clearly implies that the union may
intervene if the adjustment sought is inconsistent with the collective contract. But it is difficult to see how the language of the proviso could be
interpreted to mean that the subject matter of the grievance must be "outside of and not covered by the collective-bargaining agreement." Such
an interpretation would effect a near nullification of whatever protection
the proviso was intended to afford. The broad language of most
collective-bargaining agreements would touch upon the subject matter of
nearly every conceivable grievance so that in every instance the union
would have the right to intervene. The Dazey interpretation was also
advanced by the Board in NLRB v. North American Aviation Inc." to
limit the scope of the proviso as originally enacted under the Wagner Act.
of law. Failure of the employee to file such request was held to be fatal to an employee's
action for wrongful discharge.
51. 106 N.L.R.B. 553 (1953). The issue before the Board was whether the employer's discharge of two employees violated § 8(a) (1) which prohibits interference
with the right of employees to engage in concerted activities as guaranteed by section 7.
See note 17 supra. Determination of this issue depended upon whether the discharged
employee's conduct was protected activity under the NLRA. The collective contract
expressly provided for job classification and wage rates of workers. The discharged
employees had attempted to induce the employer to act unilaterally with regard to their
objectives without consulting the union or utilizing the grievance procedure provided
in the bargaining agreement, and accompanied their demands with a strike threat. The
Board held that the discharges were not unlawful since the employees' conduct was not
protected activity and the employer would have violated the Act by disregarding the
bargaining representative and negotiating with the individual employees. In reaching
this conclusion the Board rejected a contention that the activity was protected by § 9(a).
The General Counsel maintained that the discharged employees had not sought primarily
a change in classification, but an opportunity to utilize such change in order to leave
the bargaining unit represented by the established union. This, it was urged, was a
matter which the group had the right to take directly to the employer under the first
proviso of § 9(a).
52. Id. at 555.
53. 136 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1943).
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's argument since it would have allowed the proviso to be "nullified by drawing the agreement so as to
cover the whole field of grievances." 54 Moreover, the language in the
Dazey decision concerning this point may be considered dictum. The adjustment sought precluded an invocation of the protection of section 9 (a)
since it was clearly inconsistent with the collective-bargaining agreement."
For these reasons it is believed that the rule announced in Dazey is partially erroneous and to that extent should not be followed.
Whether or not Dazey is correct, if the grievance the employee
wished to present was within the protection of section 9(a), fulfillment
of the exhaustion requirement should depend upon the interpretation
given the proviso and the extent to which a state court desires to expand
or limit that requirement. Under the view that section 9(a) only protects the employer from a charge of an unfair labor practice, the contractual grievance machinery would be binding upon all employees emplayed under its terms. The employee's failure to exhaust that procedure
would, therefore, be fatal to his action.
On the other hand, if the proviso imposes a duty upon employers to
hear a proper grievance or vests an affirmative right in the employee,
two alternatives are available to the court. The employee could be required to invoke the aid of the union through the contractual grievance
machinery as a prerequisite to his suit, notwithstanding the right provided by section 9(a). Since an employee is not prohibited by the NLRA
from seeking union aid in the adjustment of his grievance, and the action
concerns only state created rights and remedies, the state could prescribe whatever requirements it deems proper. No federal-state conflict
would result since the NLRA does not purport to affect state common
law actions, but to establish and administer rights and duties before the
NLRB. However, if an employee who entrusts his grievance to the
union is bound under state law by the union's disposition of that grievance, an employee would be barred from obtaining further relief even
though the settlement of his grievance was unsatisfactory.56 Such a result could be used to argue against a requirement that the employee seek
the aid of the union. On the other hand, the state court could treat the
contractual grievance machinery as providing only an equal alternative,
rather than the exclusive means of processing grievances. The employer's
plea in the illustration would then fail since the employee satisfied the
exhaustion requirement by utilizing his right under section 9(a) in pre54. Id. at 899.
55. See statement of facts, note 51 supra.
56. See note 58 infra.
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senting his grievance to the employer.
This latter position would seem to import a more realistic approach
than the other alternative. An employee who is able to obtain the full
co-operation of the union in the adjustment of his grievance is not likely
to seek a settlement on his own. Moreover, requiring the employee to
seek union aid instead of permitting him to appeal directly to the state
court would effect a condonation of the employer's refusal to comply
with section 9(a). The employee should, of course, be required to have
made more than a nominal attempt at seeking adjustment of his grievance. Whether he has done so should be a factual determination to be
made in each case.
Another problem arises when the employee initially entrusts his
grievance to the union rather than pressing for relief himself. In the
event the union abandons the employee's claim without exhausting the
grievance procedure and without obtaining a disposition of the claim acceptable to the employee, a question arises whether the union's action is
dispositive of the employee's claim. If the union's action is regarded as
fulfilling the exhaustion requirement, the employee would be free to
bring an individual suit against the employer.5 7 But if the union's
failure to exhaust is regarded as the equivalent of non-exhaustion on the
part of the employee, the employee's rights would be foreclosed.5" Under
either view, it would seem that section 9(a) should not alter the result.
Obviously this is so under the first line of reasoning since the employee
still has a right to maintain his action. Under the latter view the employee, having entrusted his grievance solely to the hands of the union
and having declined to avail himself of whatever right he may have had
under section 9(a), would properly be held to have bound himself by the
57. "[T]he . . . Union failed or refused to carry [the employee's] grievances
to the second step . . . within the time provided for in the contract and as a proximate
consequence [the employee's] . . . right under the contract to have his grievance
handled under the second step was terminated. . . . Accordingly, when the Union
failed or refused to act, in affect it cut off the [employee's] . . . right to settle the
grievance under step two and exhausted the administrative remedies thereunder for
the [employee]." Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 95 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 1957).
58. Terrell v. Local 758, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 141 Cal. App. 2d 17, 296 P.2d
100 (1956). Furthermore, if there was no express promise by the union to carry employee
grievances through the complete course of grievance machinery an action for failure to do
so cannot be brought against the union. Terrell v. Local 758, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
150 Cal. App. 2d 24, 309 P.2d 130 (1957). Specific performance will not be granted to
compel the union to prosecute the grievance. Mello v. Local 4408, CIO, United Steelworkers, 82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806 (1954). However, the unions settlement does not bar
the employee's claims if the collective contract is construed to mean that the union's
action is not binding on the employee's claim. In Re Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co., 100
F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951).
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conduct of the union.5 9
A grievance clause which wholly precludes the employee's right of
self-representation creates a fairly uncomplicated situation with respect
to the rights and duties of the employer and employee under the proviso.
However, many bargaining agreements provide that, as the first step of
the grievance machinery, the employee may present his grievance to his
foreman without the aid of a union agent. If the grievance is not settled
at this stage the union is the only party empowered to negotiate the
grievance through subsequent steps.6" If the proviso vests an af firmative right in the employee, problems arise in determining the extent of the
employee's right, and in relating the exercise of this right to the exhaustion requirement.
.
The scope of the term "employer" must be determined in order to
decide whether the foreman's disposition of the grievance satisfies the requirement of the proviso or whether the employee has the right to carry
his grievance through the subsequent steps provided by the agreement.
Complications also arise in deciding at what point the employee has been
permitted to "present" his grievance. Merely allowing the employee to
call his grievance to the employer's attention may satisfy the proviso. On
the other hand, perhaps a good faith attempt at adjustment of the grievance will be required of both the employer and the employee. These difficulties may prompt the adoption of an interpretation of the proviso
which would merely grant the employer a permissive right. With regard
to the exhaustion requirement, however, the analysis under this type of
clause should not differ materially from that under the grievance clause
of the prior illustration. If the employee may rely upon section 9(a) to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state court would probably require
him to- proceed as far as is legal and practical in seeking adjustment of
his grievance without union aid.
As can readily be seen by the above analysis, no definite conclusions
59. See Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d
709 (1954). A corollary problem may arise in the event an employer permits the presentation of grievances under the proviso contrary to a clause granting the union the
exclusive right to process employee grievances. If § 9(a) only grants the employer
a permissive right which may be bargained away, the clause would be valid and the
employer's action would result in its breach. However, if the proviso vests a right in the
employee the clause should be void for illegality and the employer's "breach" would
not give rise to an action either before the Board or in a state court. 12 Am. Jur.
Contracts § 209, at 713 (1938); cf. Lewis v. Jackson & Squire Inc., 86 F. Supp. 354
o(W.D. Ark. 1949),
60. E.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.-Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 5 CCH LAB.
L. REPi. 159938 (Jan. 30, 1958) ; see generally Report of Committee on Improvement of
Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 168
(1955).
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may be reached regarding the problems discussed until a final interpretation is given the first proviso to section 9(a). When the occasion arises,
it seems probable that the Board will attempt to construe the proviso as
only vesting a permissive right in the employer. Under the Board's interpretation of the proviso as originally enacted in the Wagner Act, the
union had the right to be present and negotiate at every stage of the
grievance procedure.6 Also, as mentioned before, the Board attempted
to limit the protection of the proviso to grievances which were not
covered by the collective contract.62 These early sentiments have found
contemporaneous expression in opinions of the General Counsel" and
Davey Corp. 4 Doubtless the Board's position is premised on its judgment that the goal of industrial peace can best be reached by limiting the
individual employee's voice in grievance matters to expression through
the statutory representative. The courts, however, may tend to be less
influenced by such matters of policy than by more legalistic polemics
relevant to an interpretation of the proviso.

PROSECUTOR INDISCRETION: A RESULT OF POLITICAL
INFLUENCE
Pollock and Maitland indicate that it was the thirteenth century before barbaric justice in England was brought under control, and public
inquiries of witnesses replaced trial by combat.' But when juries ceased
to be bodies of official witnesses of facts within their knowledge and became judges of the evidence, criminal trials ceased to be wholly public
inquiries and took on characteristics of private litigation.2 It became
necessary to collect and present evidence instead of relying on the knowledge of the jury. Since parliament did not provide for a public officer
to represent the king and to collect and present this evidence, private
61. Matter of Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), inodified, 147 F.2d 69
(5th Cir. 1945). For a general review of the Board's interpretation of the proviso under
the Wagner Act, see Rose, The Processing of Labor Grievances, 38 VA. L. REV. 285,
295-310 (1952).
62. NLRB v. North American Aviation, Inc., 136 F.2d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 1943).
63. Case No. 418, 31 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1952); Case No. 317, 30 L.R.R.M. 1103
(1952). These rulings hold only that the employer can refuse to hear individual grievances
which were attempted to be presented under § 9(a). See also General Cable Corp.,
20 Lab. Arb. 443 (1953).
64. See text accompanying notes 4246 supra.
1. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 579, 598-601 (2d ed.
1898).
2. 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 496-98 (1883).

